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The objective of this paper is to evaluate the inflation targeting as a monetary policy for 
Turkey. The implementation issues and the structural contexts of five Latin American 
countries, which had adopted inflation targeting is reviewed and a comparison of Turkey 
has been conducted.  The main impediment  to the success of the inflation targeting 












   2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Price stability has been recognized as the primary objective of monetary policy since high 
and variable inflation is claimed to be socially and economically costly. Besides, 
manipulating the monetary policy instruments to attain other goals, such as output growth 
and employment, has the peril of an inflationary bias. 
 
For many years both industrial and developing countries implemented monetary policies 
which relied on intermediate targets as monetary aggregates or exchange rates. However, 
exchange rate crisis and money demand instability had proved that these strategies 
involve various shortcomings. As a result of the unsuccessful experiences, during the 
1990s, a number of industrial and developing countries have begun to focus directly on 
inflation itself. In many cases adopting an explicit inflation target is viewed to be the best 
choice of regime for anchoring expectations and guiding monetary policy decisions. This 
new approach to the problem of controlling inflation through monetary policy is known 
as inflation targeting (IT).  
 
There is a bourgeoning literature on the experiences of industrial countries with inflation 
targeting
1; however there are substantial differences between industrial and emerging 
economies, which matters for the success of IT strategy. The aim of this paper is to 
present a survey of the developing country cases that adopted inflation targeting and its 
feasibility for Turkey is investigated.    
 
Section II defines the inflation targeting and reviews the existing analytical framework 
including the discussions on open economy and imperfect credibility. Section III 
delineates the implementation issues and structural contexts of developing countries 
which put IT into practice to inspect whether they had qualified the prerequisites. Section 




                                                 
1 See Bernanke, Mishkin, and Posen (1997), Schaetter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000).   3 
2.  INFLATION TARGETING in THEORY 
 
The most widespread nominal anchors are monetary aggregates, exchange rate, and 
inflation targeting. The monetary anchor is effective if there is a stable demand for the 
monetary aggregate that is used as an anchor. Particularly,  the demand for money 
becomes very unstable in an economy that has experienced a period of high and variable 
inflation as economic agents develop ways to restrain their usage of domestic money 
balances
2. In addition, developing countries are less likely to have a complete control 
over their monetary aggregates; therefore, monetary targeting seems to be a risky strategy 
(Mussa et. al., 2000).  
 
An alternative monetary policy option for a country is adopting an exchange rate anchor. 
While the exchange rate anchor can help bring inflation down quickly and may help solve 
the time inconsistency problem, its use in emerging market countries is problematic. As 
argued by Mishkin (1998a), the use of an exchange rate anchor in an economy typified by 
an underdeveloped financial sector is risky since it would add to financial fragility and 
might launch financial crises
3. Besides, the exchange rate anchor limits the policymakers’ 
ability to react to external shocks and  leave no scope for domestic monetary policy 
(Mishkin, 1998b). Finally, it is difficult to articulate a well designed exit strategy. There 
is abundant evidence that long-term adherence to the exchange rate anchor increases the 
likelihood of overvaluations and balance of payments crises.  
 
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework based on the announcement of a 
numerical target for inflation and an institutional commitment to reach the announced 
target
4. Under this strategy, the anchor for inflation is the publicly announced inflation 
target itself. This  has several advantages over exchange rate and monetary targeting. 
Contrary to exchange rate targeting, inflation targeting allows the central banks to have 
                                                 
2 For a broader discussion on the lack of efficiency of monetary targeting, see McCallum (1999). 
3 Agenor and Montiel (1999) demonstrated that in a world of high capital mobility and unstable capital 
movements, conventional pegged exchange rates have proved fragile.   
4 In addition to these specifications, Mishkin and Savastano (2000) list information-inclusiveness, 
transparency and accountability as the main elements of IT. 
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greater discretionary power to respond to shocks of both domestic and foreign origin. 
Besides, since the relationship between money and inflation is not key to its success, a 
stable demand for money is not crucial. Obviously, there are disadvantages associated 
with inflation targeting too.  Main criticisms comprise of incomplete control over 
inflation, exposition of economy to financial instability, especially when there is partial 
dollarization, and lack of avoidance of fiscal dominance
5. According to Svensson the 
greatest problem with inflation targeting is arguably the central banks’ imperfect control 
of inflation. Due to lags in the transmission mechanism, uncertainty about the 
transmission mechanism, the current state of the economy, the future shocks to the 
economy, and the influence of other factors than monetary policy on inflation, inflation 
can be partially controlled by central banks. This creates obvious obstacles for the 
implementation and monitoring of inflation targeting considering the difficulties 
associated with extracting how much of observed inflation is as a result monetary policy 
rather than shocks and other factors. Subsequently, there would be reduction in 
accountability and transparency of inflation targeting, hence, many potential benefits of 
inflation targeting may not actualize.  
 
2.1. Analytical Framework 
 
This section is based on the works of Svensson, Ball, and Eichengreen and discusses 
briefly the analytical framework of inflation targeting starting from a closed economy and 
then moving to an open economy setting. Svensson (1997) proposes utilizing conditional 
inflation forecast as an intermediate target variable. This idea is first expressed by King 
(1994) as follows: “… the intermediate target is the expected level of inflation at some 
future date chosen to allow for the lag between changes in interest rates and the resulting 
changes in inflation”. In order to implement inflation targeting effectively, an inflation-
targeting central bank must have a forward-looking perspective, and must construct 
conditional inflation forecasts in order to decide upon the current instrument setting.  
 
                                                 
5 There are also criticisms concerning the rigidity of inflation targeting, full discretion, increased output 
instability. See, Mishkin and Savastano (2000).    5 
The instrument setting depends on which type of inflation targeting is chosen. Basically 
there are two types, namely strict and flexible inflation targeting, where in the former 
only inflation enters the CB’s objective function and in the latter there is also a positive 
weight on other variables. While strict inflation targeting entails a rapid push towards the 
target under all circumstances,  under  flexible inflation targeting  actual inflation 
converges  to the target rate gradually. It will balance the benefits of minimizing the 
variability of inflation against the costs of creating additional variability in other variables 
that enter its objective function.  
 
If the short term nominal interest rate
6 is the instrument employed by the central bank, the 
optimal rate could be derived as follows: 
 
? t+1 = ? t + a (yt – y
*) + ?t+1               (1) 
yt+1 – y
*= ? (yt – y
*) – ß (rt – r
*) + nt+1          (2) 
 
Equation (1) is an accelerationist Phillips curve, where the change in inflation (?) 
between this period and next is a function of this period’s gap between actual output (y) 
and its natural level (y
*) and of a disturbance. Equation (2) is aggregate demand, where 
next period’s output gap is a function of this period’s output gap, the deviation of the 
interest rate (r) from normal (r
*), and a disturbance. The key assumption is that the 
control lag until inflation responds to the central bank’s instrument (r) is longer than the 
control lag for AD.  
 
Under strict IT, the optimal policy is to target inflation two periods ahead, setting ? t+2 = 
?
* denotes target inflation. Inflation one period ahead is given by output in the current 
period, which is predetermined; hence inflation one period ahead cannot be controlled. 
Solving for the optimal reaction function gives: 
 
rt = r
* + F (? t - ?
*) + ? (yt – y
*)            (3) 
 
                                                 
6 Many different central banks employ different instruments to reach to the target inflation rate.    6 
Strict inflation targeting framework requires setting ? equal to zero, since the sole 
objective of the central bank is to manipulate the short term interest rate in order to draw 
back the inflation to its target level
7. Flexible IT is the case in which both F and ? are 
positive. Indeed, all emerging country central banks that implement inflation targeting 
have adopted flexible inflation targeting strategies.  Most of Svensson’s work finds 
support for flexible IT and gradual convergence to the target.  
 
2.2. Open Economy and Imperfect Credibility 
 
The above models are applicable to closed economies and one needs to move further to 
look at the cases of an open economy, since most of the developing countries are highly 
integrated into the world markets. With openness the economy  is exposed to foreign 
shocks to both commodity and financial markets and it introduces additional channels for 
policy.  For instance, the policy instrument (r) will  now  affect output also indirectly 
through its impact on the exchange rate.  The indirect channel will reduce net export 
demand by appreciating the exchange rate. In a financially open economy the interest 
parity condition is:  
 
et – E(et+1) = rt -  r
’ + vt              (4) 
 
where exchange rate is defined as the foreign price of domestic currency, r
’ is the foreign 




*= ? (yt – y
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From equation (2’) we can deduce that i n open economies adjustments in the policy 
instruments will be smaller if the output response is larger.  Otherwise  the reaction 
function is unaffected. However, if exchange rate movements also affect inflation directly 
                                                 
7 However, since the coefficients depend on the values a, ?, and ß, even under strict IT there is still a 
positive weight on output in the reaction function because of its information content for future inflation. 
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with the same one-period lag as it is affected by the output gap the implications are more 
complicated. We rewrite equation (1) as: 
 
? t+1 = ? t + a (yt – y
*) – ? (et – et-1) + ?t+1          (1’) 
 
Under an open  economy setting, strict inflation targeting generates more output 
instability. Besides, the CB will move more slowly to restore inflation to its target level. 
Given that the policy instrument, operating through the exchange rate, has a more 
powerful first-period effect on inflation, policy is used more moderately in response to 
deviations from the target. In emerging markets the changes in import prices due to 
movements in the exchange rate are passed through into domestic prices more rapidly 
than industrial countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). With high passthrough, a change in 
the exchange rate has a large short-run impact on inflation and a small short-run impact 
on output.  An open economy is  vulnerable to shocks  stemming from international 
commodity and financial markets. Even though exchange rate is affected by both kind of 
shocks, the appropriate policy response by an inflation targeting central bank will depend 
on the source of the shock.  
 
According to Ball the optimal policy in the closed economy ought to be distinct from the 
one in a closed economy. In the former case, interest rate, which depends on output and 
inflation, could be used whereas in the latter, the monetary policy instrument that is a 
combination of the exchange r ate and the interest r ate, MCI, could be employed. 
Monetary condition index is a linear combination of the exchange rate and a nominal 
short-term interest rate. In Ball’s model, the weight attached to the exchange rate is 
greatly contingent  on the degree of passthrough from exchange rate to prices. 
Nevertheless, Svensson asserts that even though a MCI could be used as a control 
variable, the outcome is the same as using the short-term interest rate and hence there is 
no advantage in targeting the exchange rate.   
 
Finally, some  issues concerning credibility will be elaborated since it is  substantial, 
especially, for the developing countries. The expected inflation can be written as:   8 
E (? t+1) = ??
*
t + (1-?)? t              (5) 
                   
The above equation describes the expectation of the one-period ahead inflation rate as a 
weighted average of the current inflation rate and the inflation target announced by the 
authorities. The weight given to the inflation target variable depends on the credibility of 
the monetary authorities. In one extreme, with a fully credible monetary authority the 
public sets its inflation expectation equal to the inflation target (? = 1) while, in the other 
extreme, the public pays no attention to the announced target and assumes that the current 
inflation rate persists into the next period.  
 
To the extent that inflation targeting is less credible in emerging markets, its benefits will 
be less. In the case of lack of confidence that the central bank is committed to low 
inflation, interest rates will not fall to the levels of other low-inflation countries. Shocks 
will raise questions about whether authorities are prepared to stay the course. Sharp 
changes in interest rates, exchange rates and international capital flows may feed upon 
themselves. Firms will not decrease their prices to meet the inflation target if policy is not 
credible. Then the attempts of hitting the target will require an increase in interest rates 




There is a tradeoff between flexibility and credibility. As we will see in the next section, 
many decisions about the implementation of inflation targeting are contingent upon this 
tradeoff. Particularly, imperfect credibility may require the central bank to target inflation 





                                                 
8 The same negative implications also follow, of course, for any other monetary regime if the financial 
system is fragile, the commitment to fiscal discipline is questionable, the monetary authorities lack 
autonomy and independence, and the economy is subject to foreign disturbances.  
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3.   INFLATION TARGETING in PRACTICE 
 
The next sections will describe the main decisions and steps that need to be taken by a 
country a iming to adopt an IT framework,  the necessary economic and political 
conditions for the implementation of an IT framework, and the possibility of 
implementing inflation targeting in emerging markets with examples from five Latin 
American countries.  
 
3.1. Implementation Issues 
 
In  Bernanke et al. (1999) the following operational issues in the implementation of an 
inflation targeting framework are distinguished. First, it should be decided whether a 
strict or flexible IT should be adopted by the CB. Second, who will decide the target and 
who will be accountable for this decision. Third, the  measure of inflation should be 
decided. Fourth, the numerical value of the target should be determined. Fifth, a point 
target or a range for the target should be chosen.  And finally the horizon of the target 
should be defined. 
 
For a CB, which would like to initiate an IT framework, the first decision that needs to be 
taken is strict vs. flexible IT. The former aims to achieve the inflation target rapidly 
regardless of output stabilization, while, the latter tries to accomplish the target gradually 
with some considerations for output stabilization. Strict inflation targeting is claimed to 
be advantageous for providing credibility but in fact, all of the central banks that have 
adopted IT framework preferred flexible IT. None of the countries merely emphasize 
price stability, leaving the output stability aside.  
 
Next, who will decide the target and who is accountable for it should be decided. The 
tension arises because of the necessity of having an independent central bank and the 
accountability attached to the democratic policymaking process. This could be overcome 
by attributing instrument independence to the central bank. With an arrangement of this 
type, the ultimate goal of monetary policy is set by a politically accountable decision   10 
maker but the central bank is completely independent in the choice of instruments of 
monetary policy necessary to reach this goal. From Table 1, we could see that except 
Mexico, the inflation target is set jointly by government and central bank. Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) assert that all central banks in these countries have been granted 
a substantial degree of independence in the 1990s and central bank loans to the 
government are prohibited. In Chile and Colombia the Minister of Finance is a member 
of the Central Bank Board, which is an arrangement aiming to increase the coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy.  
 
The third question relates to which measure of inflation should be targeted. Core inflation 
is used as a measure of the policy target by the central banks since total CPI involves the 
problem of  noisy and erratic short-run movements in prices
9. Such measures are 
generally calculated by removing some components of the price indexes, particularly 
those that appear to be substantially more volatile than prices of other goods and services. 
It is argued that short-term movements in these prices result from rapid adjustment to 
frequent real shocks that are often reversed, and so they contain substantially less 
information about the long-term trend in inflation. The main  disadvantage of core 
inflation is that it is less transparent and could not be clearly understood by the public as 
total CPI. Hence, as in many other issues, the choice of what kind of inflation index the 
central bank should target implies a trade-off between flexibility and transparency 
(Bernanke et. al. 1999). In all countries under consideration Total CPI has been utilized 
as the target index since it is easy to monitor and form inflation expectations. 
 
Fourthly, the numerical value of the target should be defined. Even though the price 
stability is the main goal of the central banks, it is argued widely that the inflation target 
should be low and above zero. There are several reasons to choose a positive inflation 
target. First of all, the undershooting of the target in the case of  zero inflation would 
engender deflation and it would harm the functioning of the financial system. Second, 
because of substitution effects and quality improvements, inflation estimates are likely to 
                                                 
9 See Roger (1998) and Wynee (1999) for recent reviews of the literature on core inflation.  
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overstate the true increase in prices (Boskin et. al. 1996). Third, downward rigidity in 
nominal wages will necessitate some positive inflation for real wage adjustments. Fourth, 
as the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, with zero inflation it is impossible to have 
a negative real rate. It is also argued that developing countries should aim a somewhat 
higher inflation rate than the industrial countries. The target rate has been cut down 
continuously in all countries and still stay above zero.  
 
The fifth implementation issue is whether the target should be expressed as a point or a 
range. Many inflation targeting countries have chosen to specify their inflation target in 
the form of a band rather than a single point since economic behavior and outcomes are 
not completely predictable  it is difficult to hit continuously a single point target for 
inflation. The width of the band should rely on the variability of the rate of inflation, the 
policy horizon,  plus the degree of discretion that the central bank maintains in the 
conduct of monetary policy.  This degree of discretion also brings along a tradeoff 
between credibility and flexibility in the choice of the optimal target band. A wider target 
has a greater possibility of success but it would be also less credible
10. Another issue is 
whether the band should be asymmetric or not. If, for instance, the central bank believes 
that the credibility loss associated with overshooting the target is higher than the loss 




The last issue is the choice of the policy horizon or the time frame in which the target 
should be achieved. Bernanke et. al. (1999) claim that very short and very long policy 
horizons are meaningless because, with very short horizons, it may be impossible to 
reach the inflation target at a reasonable cost and very long targets would play little role 
in setting inflation expectations
12. The optimal length of the target horizon depends also 
on policy preferences, in addition to the magnitude of the shocks affecting inflation. The 
                                                 
10 In some sense, the choice of an optimal inflation target band is reminiscent of the problem of choosing 
the optimal width of an exchange rate target zone.  
11 However, in 1997 and 1998, Peru and Chile paid a high cost for undershooting their inflation targets. 
12 A very short horizon could also produce ‘instrument instability’ (Masson et. al., 1997). 
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greater the r elative importance attached to output stabilization relative to inflation 
stabilization, the longer the optimal length
13. Svensson (1997) has emphasized, if central 
banks are concerned about output fluctuations, then the inflation forecast should approach 
the long-run inflation target gradually over time. This implies that a horizon even longer 
than the policy lags that might be appropriate for the inflation target (Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). Brazil and Mexico (Bank of Brazil, 1999, and Bank of Mexico, 
2000) have adopted multi-year annual targets so that the path of the inflation target can 
converge to the long-run inflation goal more gradually. Another alternative is announcing 
only one long-term target and publishing inflation rates for future years to describe the 
expected path of inflation toward the long-run target, which is adopted by Chile (Central 
Bank of Chile, 2000).  
 
3.2. Necessary Conditions 
 
Masson et al. (1997) describe the necessary economic and political conditions for the 
implementation of a successful IT framework as the presence of an independent CB, and 
lack of binding commitments to other variables. However, the paper will mainly focus on 
the first prerequisite given that the Latin American countries that implement inflation 
targeting framework shifted to a floating regime already. As so far, the second necessary 
condition seems to be accepted by all countries with minor exceptions. Mexico carries on 
intervention since the 1994 crisis and Peru continues to use intervention to smooth sharp 
fluctuations. We believe that  the first necessary condition is more challenging for 
emerging market economies to be fulfilled.   
 
Central bank independence is essential for the success of an inflation targeting framework 
since the bank should be able to use its instrument freely.  Instrument independence
14 
could be achieved if there is lack of fiscal dominance. In particular, inflation targeting 
must be supported by the reform and reinforcement of fiscal institutions as a way of 
delivering better fiscal outcomes. Moreover, shallow capital markets are also a subtle 
                                                 
13 See Isard and Laxton (2000) for recent quantitative research on policy tradeoffs of this type.  
14 Goal independence is not central to the inflation targeting strategy, besides, for a better coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy, the goal should be set jointly by government and central bank.    13 
manifestation of fiscal dominance. To assess the fiscal and financial sectors in developing 
countries, several indicators are evaluated in the next section for five Latin American 
countries and Turkey. 
 
3.2.1. Key Financial Ratios 
 
Masson et. al. (1997) applies the freedom from fiscal dominance and firm commitments 
to other nominal targets criteria to a sample of developed and developing countries. They 
find that, in most developing countries, fiscal dominance and an underdeveloped and 
fragile financial system are serious obstacles to the conduct of an independent monetary 
policy.  Different from their indicators we employed some of the financial depth and 
efficiency indicators used by World B ank and IMF to check out if they have exhibited 
any improvement in financial terms before adopting inflation targeting framework. 
Besides, the same ratios will be assessed for Turkey for an extended time period to make 
a comparison.  
 
As seen From Figure 1.a. through Figure 4.a. all countries display similar developments 
with the exception of Brazil for the first three indicators. The ‘Real’ plan, which has 
started to be implemented in 1994, could explain the drastic decline in monetary 
aggregates and domestic credit provided by the banking sector in Brazil. Chile appears to 
be financially more advanced compared to the other Latin American countries at issue. 
This is largely due to the banking regulations and supervision practiced in the aftermath 
of the severe banking crisis of 1980s. The resulting solidity of the Chilean financial 
system has allowed the central bank to proceed defending the currency and the banks. In 
addition, the controls on short-term capital flows have been another important factor 
behind the low vulnerability and relative stability of the Chilean economy.  The Latin 
American countries improved slightly in financial terms before the start of the inflation 
targeting framework. Nonetheless, tenuous banking sector remains to be a problem for 
Mexico and to a lesser extent for Peru.  
   14 
The financial indicator figures for Turkey (Figure 1.b- 4.b) resemble to the Latin 
American countries regarding the movements, however, especially domestic credit and 
market capitalization ratios are lower. In recent years several measures have been 
attempted to be employed to strengthen the banking sector and supervision
15.  One 
distinctive feature of the Turkish financial system is the extensive pressure put on it by 
the borrowing requirements of government. Fiscal sector will be investigated in the next 
section.  
 
3.2.2. Key Fiscal Ratios 
 
Chile’s fiscal position is the strongest among all countries and had been a major support 
for the success of the inflation targeting framework. During the period of 1990-98, the 
overall budget (as a % of GDP) gave surplus every year. In 1998 the economy entered 
into a recession as a result of the tight monetary policy and undershooting of the inflation 
target and surplus declined. Central government debt also showed a continuous decrease 
over the same period. Colombia’s fiscal surplus began to deteriorate after 1991 and 
turned into deficits afterwards. In 1998, it reached the highest level, 5.11% of GDP, and 
with the high external deficits and political instability, it led to a cord of speculative 
attacks. Peru seemed to improve her fiscal balances after 1995, although, it went back to 
negative figures in 1998 following the adverse shocks. While the overall budget deficit in 
Mexico has not been high over the years of 1990-98, it appears that Mexico has not been 
able to recover from the 1994 crisis. Finally, fiscal discipline is lacking in Brazil and 
fiscal dominance is pervasive for Brazilian economy. Overall budget deficit stayed at 
high levels averaging approximately 6% of GDP from 1990-98.  
 
From Figure 5.b. to Figure 6.b. it can be observed that the public sector in Turkey has 
been experiencing serious troubles regarding the increasing debt and large fiscal deficits. 
The major problem with respect to inflation targeting is the existence of fiscal inflation in 
Turkey. The enormous fiscal burden and hence fiscal dominance feeds the inflationary 
                                                 
15 Regulations on capital adequacy requirements and the ceiling on banks’ net open foreign exchange 
positions are especially important.    15 
expectations as well as cause the inflation to be a fiscal phenomenon. A contractionary 
monetary policy measure aimed at lowering inflation pressure caused by government 
debt will initially lower seigniorage revenue and require that additional debt be issued, 
which ultimately will lead to higher inflation.  
 
4. OPTIONS for TURKEY 
 
In the light of discussions of the previous sections, the possibility of adopting inflation 
targeting monetary strategy in Turkey and some implementation issues will be evaluated. 
The initial stage pertaining to inflation targeting framework in Turkey is to establish a 
successful disinflationary period and  cut down inflation to moderate levels before 
launching inflation targeting as a nominal anchoring policy. Although, the inflation rates 
were relatively high in Chile, Peru and Israel when they adopted the inflation targeting 
framework, Turkish inflation rates are well above. Moreover, before moving to the hard 
targeting it would be useful to use intermediate targets or officially pre-announced 
projections. In Chile, also, inflation targets were announced and interpreted as official 
inflation projects, rather than as hard targets
16.  
 
Yet, the main impediment to inflation targeting in Turkey, in our view, is fiscal 
dominance. There is vast empirical evidence that, because of procyclicality of capital 
flows, high levels of external debt, high burden of interest payments,  and limited 
creditworthiness, emerging market economies have limited scope for fiscal adjustment 
and often have procyclical fiscal policies. These procyclical policies are partly due to the 
fact that, during periods of economic expansion, emerging market countries did not build 
surpluses and accumulate resources to be used during recessions.  
 
Furthermore, as stated by Gavin et al. (1996), seigniorage has been an important 
component of fiscal adjustments during recessions. Thus, the monetary authorities are put 
under further pressure during recessions, since monetary policy is the only 
                                                 
16 However, over time as inflation fell, this procedure was altered and inflation targets came to be viewed 
by the central bank and the markets as hard targets.  
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countercyclical instrument and therefore the monetary authority should fight the 
recession by implementing an expansionary monetary policy, however the deterioration 
of the fiscal position will generate  inflationary expectations linked to the possible 
monetization of the deficit and the central bank will have to either accommodate these 
expectations or to adopt a restrictive monetary policy that is likely to worsen the 
recession. This generates a difficult dilemma for the developing countries with weak 
fiscal positions.  During recessions, when they mostly need an expansionary monetary 
policy, the central bank will have to keep a firm stance on monetary policy in order to 
maintain its credibility and prevent the formation of inflationary expectations. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the paper inflation targeting as a monetary strategy and its feasibility for developing 
countries is surveyed. The implementation issues and the structural contexts of five Latin 
American countries, which had adopted inflation targeting is reviewed and a comparison 
of Turkey has been conducted. There are several complexities linked to the execution of 
inflation targeting in developing countries such as the openness of the economy and the 
imperfect credibility. Besides, the necessary conditions are not fulfilled by the developing 
countries. From the overview, it can be seen that the main impediment to the success of 
the inflation targeting framework in Latin America and Turkey, is fiscal dominance.  
 
The country experiences suggest that there are various ways of implementing inflation 
targeting monetary strategy. Particularly, who will decide the target, what will be the 
target, the index used, and the horizon of the target,  varies across countries. Well 
regulated financial institutions, sound fiscal system, and absence of other nominal 
anchors are the prerequisites for adoption.  However, many Latin American countries 
appear to be deficient in terms of financial and fiscal ratios, maybe with the exception of 
Chile. The same indicators for Turkey demonstrate that the problem is mainly fiscal. 
Under fiscal dominance inflation becomes a non-monetary phenomenon; hence, the 
monetary authorities lose their control over inflation. 
   17 
For further research  the implementation issues for Turkey should be explored in detail 
and the coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities should be increased. Since 
the public sector deficits and borrowing requirements affect the financial sector the 
instrument of the monetary authority should be determined jointly. Besides, the 
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Table 1. Implementation Issues of Inflation Targeting in Latin American Countries 
 
 
Country  Date 
Introduced 








Current Exchange Rate Regime 
Brazil  June 1999  Government in 
consultation with the CB 
1999: 8% (+,- 2)  Total 
CPI 
1 year  Overnight interest 
rate 
Floating 
      2000: 6% (+,- 2)       
      2001: 4% (+,- 2)       
      2002: 3.5%       
               
Chile  September 
1999 
CB in consultation with 
Minister of Finance 





rate (real terms) 
Floating 
      1992: 13-16%  2001 onwards: 
indefinite 
      1993: 10-12%       
      1994: 9-11%       
      1995: 8%         
      1996: 6.5%       
      1997: 5.5%       
      1998: 4.5%       
      1999: 4.3%       
      2000: 3.5%       
      2001 onwards: 2-4%       
               
Colombia  September 
1999 
Government in 
consultation with the CB 
1999:15%  Total 
CPI 
1 year  Monetary Base 
(daily) 
Floating 
      2000:10%         
      2001:8%         
      2002: 6%         
               






Floating with intervention 
      2000: <10%  2002 onwards: 
indefinite 
      2001:6.5%        
      2002: 4.5%         21 
 
Table 1. Implementation Issues of Inflation Targeting in Latin American Countries 
 
Country  Date 
Introduced 








Current Exchange Rate Regime 
Peru  1994  CB in consultation with 
Minister of Finance 
1994: 15-20%  Total CPI  1 year  Monetary Base 
(daily) 
Floating. Intervention can be 
used to smooth fluctuations 
      1995: 9-11%       
      1996: 9.5-11.5%       
      1997: 8-10%       
      1998: 7.5-9%       
      1999: 5-6%       
      2000: 3.5-4%       
      2001: 2.5-3.5%       
      2002: 1.5-2.5%        
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Figure 1a: Liquid Liabilities to GDP in Latin American Countries: 1990-98 
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Figure 1b: Liquid Liabilities to GDP in Turkey: 1990-2001 
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Figure 2a: Quasi-Liquid Liabilities to GDP in Latin American Countries: 1990-98 
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Figure 2b: Quasi-Liquid Liabilities to GDP in Turkey: 1990-2001 
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Figure 3a: Domestic Credit provided by Banking Sector to GDP in Latin American 
Countries: 1990-98 
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Figure 3b: Domestic Credit provided by Banking Sector to GDP in Turkey: 1990-2000 
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